Expert answer:Mode 10 Sextus Empiricus Discussion

  

Solved by verified expert:ASSIGNMENT:IT’S JUST WRONG! After reading through Mode 10 of Sextus Empiricus (posted on Blackboard), pick three beliefs or practices or customs of the many that Sextus identifies that you think are just wrong – any time, any where.For each of the three that you have chosen, say why you think it is wrong.Your answer should not exceed 60 words.Think of the assignment as talking points.Be prepared to explain your answer in greater depth in classroom discussion.
sextus__tenth_mode__line__s.doc

sextus__method_w_line__s.doc

Don't use plagiarized sources. Get Your Custom Essay on
Expert answer:Mode 10 Sextus Empiricus Discussion
Just from $10/Page
Order Essay

Unformatted Attachment Preview

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
THE TENTH MODE
There is a Tenth Mode, which is mainly concerned with Ethics, being based on rules of
conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions. A rule of conduct is a
choice of a way of life, or of a particular action, adopted by one person or many — by
Diogenes, for instance, or the Laconians. A law is a written contract amongst the
members of a state, the transgressor of which is punished. A habit or custom (the terms
are equivalent) is the joint adoption of a certain kind of action by a number of men, the
transgressor of which is not actually punished; for example, the law proscribes adultery,
and custom with us forbids intercourse with a woman in public. Legendary belief is the
acceptance of unhistorical and fictitious events, such as, amongst others, the legends
about Cronos; for these stories win credence with many. Dogmatic conception is the
acceptance of a fact which seems to be established by analogy or some form of
demonstration, as, for example, that atoms are the elements of existing things, or
homoeomeries, or minima, or something else.
And each of these we oppose now to itself, and now to each of the others. For example,
we oppose habit to habit in this way: some of the Ethiopians tattoo their children, but we
do not; and while the Persians think it seemly to wear a brightly dyed dress reaching to
the feet, we think it unseemly; and whereas the Indians have intercourse with their
women in public, most other races regard this as shameful.
And law we oppose to law in this way: among the Romans the man who renounces his
father’s property does not pay his father’s debts, but among the Rhodians he always
pays them; and among the Scythian Tauri it was a law that strangers should be
sacrificed to Artemis, but with us it is forbidden to slay a human being at the altar. And
we oppose rule of conduct to rule of conduct, as when we oppose the rule of Diogenes to
that of Aristippus or that of the Laconians to that of the Italians.
And we oppose legendary belief to legendary belief when we say that whereas in one
story the father of men and gods is alleged to be Zeus, in another he is Oceanos -“Ocean sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother that bare them.”
And we oppose dogmatic conceptions to one another when we say that some declare that
there is one element only, others an infinite number; some that the soul is mortal, others
that it is immortal; and some that human affairs are controlled by divine Providence,
others without Providence.
And we oppose habit to the other things, as for instance to law when we say that
amongst the Persians it is the habit to indulge in intercourse with males, but amongst the
Romans it is forbidden by law to do so; and that, whereas with us adultery is forbidden,
amongst the Massagetae it is traditionally regarded as an indifferent custom, as
Eudoxus of Cnidos relates in the first book of his Travels; and that, whereas intercourse
with a mother is forbidden in our country, in Persia it is the general custom to form such
marriages; and also among the Egyptians men marry their sisters, a thing forbidden by
law amongst us. And habit is opposed to rule of conduct when, whereas most men have
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
intercourse with their own wives in retirement, Crates did it in public with Hipparchia;
and Diogenes went about with one shoulder bare, whereas we dress in the customary
manner. It is opposed also to legendary belief, as when the legends say that Cronos
devoured his own children, though it is our habit to protect our children; and whereas it
is customary with us to revere the gods as being good and immune from evil, they are
presented by the poets as suffering wounds and envying one another. And habit is
opposed to dogmatic conception when, whereas it is our habit to pray to the gods for
good things, Epicurus declares that the Divinity pays no heed to us; and when
Aristippus considers the wearing of feminine attire a matter of indifference, though we
consider it a disgraceful thing.
And we oppose rule of conduct to law when, though there is a law which forbids the
striking of a free or well-born man, the pancratiasts strike one another because of the
rule of life they follow; and when, though homicide is forbidden, gladiators destroy one
another for the same reason. And we oppose legendary belief to rule of conduct when we
say that the legends relate that Heracles in the house of Omphale “toiled at the spinning
of wool, enduring slavery’s burden,” and did things which no one would have chosen to
do even in a moderate degree, whereas the rule of life of Heracles was a noble one. And
we oppose rule of conduct to dogmatic conception when, whereas athletes covet glory as
something good and for its sake undertake a toilsome rule of life, many of the
philosophers dogmatically assert that glory is a worthless thing.
And we oppose law to legendary belief when the poets represent the gods as committing
adultery and practicing intercourse with males, whereas the law with us forbids such
actions; and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when Chrysippus says that intercourse
with mothers or sisters is a thing indifferent, whereas the law forbids such things.
And we oppose legendary belief to dogmatic conception when the poets say that Zeus
came down and had intercourse with mortal women, but amongst the Dogmatists it is
held that such a thing is impossible; and again, when the poet relates that because of his
grief for Sarpedon Zeus “let fall upon the earth great gouts of blood,” whereas it is a
dogma of the philosophers that the Deity is impassive; and when these same
philosophers demolish the legend of the hippocentaurs, and offer us the hippocentaur as
a type of unreality.
We might indeed have taken many other examples in connection with each of the
antitheses above mentioned; but in a concise account like ours, these will be sufficient.
Only, since by means of this Mode also so much divergency is shown to exist in objects,
we shall not be able to state what character belongs to the object in respect of its real
essence, but only what belongs to it in respect of this particular rule of conduct, or law,
or habit, and so on with each of the rest. So because of this Mode also we are compelled
to suspend judgment regarding the real nature of external objects. And thus by means
of all the Ten Modes we are finally led to suspension of judgment.
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
CHAPTER IV. — WHAT SCEPTICISM IS
Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in
any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and
reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a
state of “unperturbedness” or quietude. Now we call it an “ability” not in any subtle
sense, but simply in respect of its “being able.” By “appearances” we now mean the
objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or
“judgements.” The phrase “in any way whatsoever” can be connected either with the
word “ability,” to make us take the word “ability,” as we said, in its simple sense, or
with the phrase “opposing appearances to judgements”; for inasmuch as we oppose
these in a variety of ways – appearances to appearances, or judgements to judgements,
or alternando appearances to judgements, — in order to ensure the inclusion of all these
antitheses we employ the phrase “in any way whatsoever.” Or, again, we join “in any
way whatsoever” to “appearances and judgements” in order that we may not have to
inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may
take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase “opposed judgements” we do not
employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to
“conflicting judgements.” “Equipollence” we use of equality in respect of probability
and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes
precedence of any other as being more probable. “Suspense” is a state of mental rest
owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. “Quietude” is an untroubled and
tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of
judgement we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) “Concerning the End.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
CHAPTER VI. — OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SCEPTICISM
The originating cause of Scepticism is, we say, the hope of attaining quietude. Men
of talent, who were perturbed by the contradictions in things and in doubt as to
which of the alternatives they ought to accept, were led on to inquire what is true in
things and what false, hoping by the settlement of this question to attain quietude.
The main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every
proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that as a consequence of this we
end by ceasing to dogmatize.
CHAPTER VIII. — HAS THE SCEPTIC A DOCTRINAL RULE?
We follow the same lines in replying to the question “Has the Sceptic a doctrinal
rule?” For if one defines a “doctrinal rule” as “adherence to a number of dogmas
which are dependent both on one another and on appearances,” and defines
“dogma” as “assent to a nonevident proposition,” then we shall say that he has not
a doctrinal rule. But if one defines “doctrinal rule” as “procedure which, in
accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of reasoning, that reasoning
indicating how it is possible to seem to live rightly (the word ‘rightly’ being taken,
not as referring to virtue only, but in a wider sense) and tending to enable one to
suspend judgement, then we say that he has a doctrinal rule. For we follow a line of
reasoning which, in accordance with appearances, points us to a life conformable to
the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our own instinctive
feelings.
CHAPTER XI. — OF THE CRITERION OF SCEPTICISM
That we adhere to appearances is plain from what we say about the Criterion of the
Sceptic School. The word “Criterion” is used in two senses: in the one it means “the
standard regulating belief in reality or unreality,” (and this we shall discuss in our
refutation); in the other it denotes the standard of action by conforming to which in
the conduct of life we perform some actions and abstain from others; and it is of the
latter that we are now speaking. The criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we say,
the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation. For
since this lies in feeling and involuntary affection, it is not open to question.
Consequently, no one, I suppose, disputes that the underlying object has this or
that appearance; the point in dispute is whether the object is in reality such as it
appears to be.
Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life,
undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem
that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of
Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, Another in the tradition of laws
and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature’s guidance is that by
which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions
is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as
evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we
adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically.
CHAPTER XII. — WHAT IS THE END OF SCEPTICISM?
Our next subject will be the end of the Sceptic system. Now an “end” is “that for
which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists for the sake of none”;
or, otherwise, “the ultimate object of appentency.” We assert still that the Sceptic’s
End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of
things unavoidable. For the skeptic, having set out to philosophize with the object
of passing judgment on the sense impressions and ascertaining which of them are
true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in
contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them
suspended judgment; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it
happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For the man who
opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he
is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by
things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good;
which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because
of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he
uses every endeavor to avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other
hand, the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither
shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.
The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the
painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to
represent in the painting the horse’s foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up
the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints
off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse’s foam. So,
too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision
regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to
effect this they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by chance,
followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not,
however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is
troubled by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times and thirsty, and
suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary
people are afflicted by two circumstances, — namely, by the affections themselves
and, in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions are evil by nature, –the
Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of all these
conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort. Hence we say that, while in
regard to matters of opinion the Sceptic’s End is quietude, in regard to things
unavoidable it is “moderate affection.” But some notable Sceptics have added the
further definition “suspension of judgment in investigations.”

Purchase answer to see full
attachment

Place your order
(550 words)

Approximate price: $22

Calculate the price of your order

550 words
We'll send you the first draft for approval by September 11, 2018 at 10:52 AM
Total price:
$26
The price is based on these factors:
Academic level
Number of pages
Urgency
Basic features
  • Free title page and bibliography
  • Unlimited revisions
  • Plagiarism-free guarantee
  • Money-back guarantee
  • 24/7 support
On-demand options
  • Writer’s samples
  • Part-by-part delivery
  • Overnight delivery
  • Copies of used sources
  • Expert Proofreading
Paper format
  • 275 words per page
  • 12 pt Arial/Times New Roman
  • Double line spacing
  • Any citation style (APA, MLA, Chicago/Turabian, Harvard)

Our guarantees

Delivering a high-quality product at a reasonable price is not enough anymore.
That’s why we have developed 5 beneficial guarantees that will make your experience with our service enjoyable, easy, and safe.

Money-back guarantee

You have to be 100% sure of the quality of your product to give a money-back guarantee. This describes us perfectly. Make sure that this guarantee is totally transparent.

Read more

Zero-plagiarism guarantee

Each paper is composed from scratch, according to your instructions. It is then checked by our plagiarism-detection software. There is no gap where plagiarism could squeeze in.

Read more

Free-revision policy

Thanks to our free revisions, there is no way for you to be unsatisfied. We will work on your paper until you are completely happy with the result.

Read more

Privacy policy

Your email is safe, as we store it according to international data protection rules. Your bank details are secure, as we use only reliable payment systems.

Read more

Fair-cooperation guarantee

By sending us your money, you buy the service we provide. Check out our terms and conditions if you prefer business talks to be laid out in official language.

Read more

Order your essay today and save 30% with the discount code ESSAYSHELP