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Expert answer:Differences of Freud and Karl Marx Views of Human - Ray writers

Solved by verified expert:PROMPT: Marx and Freud both have different views of human nature. Answer: What is their view of human nature? How do their views affect their prescriptions for the direction that society should take? Do you find their views of human nature and their prescriptions for society based on those views compelling?4 pages double space, size 12, times new roman.USE ATTACHED RESOURCES FOR ESSAY.Essay outline: 1- introduction 2- Marx view of human nature, freud view of human nature 3- How do their views affect their prescriptions for the direction that society should take?4- How compelling are their theories?5- conclusion


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I .

Sigmund Freud
James Strachey
Peter Gay
w .W·
New York· London
It is impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement-that they seek
power, success and wealth for themselves and admire them
in others, and that they underestimate what is of true value
in life. And yet, in making any general judgement of this
sort, we are in danger of forgetting how variegated the
human world and its mental life are. There are a few men
from whom their contemporaries do not withhold admiration, although their greatness rests on attributes and
achievements which are completely foreign to the aims and
ideals of the multitude. One might easily be inclined to
suppose that it is after all only a minority which appreciates
these great men, while the large majority cares nothing for
them. But things are probably not as simple as that, thanks
to the discrepancies between people’s thoughts and their
actions, and to the diversity of their wishful impulses.
One of these exceptional few calls himself my friend in
his letters to me. I had sent him my small book that treats
religion as an illusion,l and he answered that he entirely
agreed with my judgement upon religion, but that he was
sorry I had not properly appreciated the true source of religious sentiments. This, he says,consists in a peculiar feeling,
I(The Future of an nlusion (1927C)].
Civilization and Its Discontents
( 11
which he himself is never without, which he finds confirmed
by many others, and which he may suppose is present in
millions of people. It is a feeling which he would like to call
a sensation of ‘eternity’, a feeling as of something limitless,
unbounded-as it were, ‘oceanic’. This feeling, he adds, is
a purely subjective fact, not an article of faith; it brings with
it no assurance of personal immortality, but it is the source
of the religious energy which is seized upon by the various
Churches and religious systems, directed by them into particular channels, and doubtless also exhausted by them. One
may, he thinks, rightly call oneself religious on the ground
of this oceanic feeling alone, even if one rejects every belief
and every illusion.
The views expressed by the friend whom I so much honour, and who himself once praised the magic of illusion in
a poem,2 caused me no small difficulty. I cannot discover
this ‘oceanic’ feeling in myself. It is not easy to deal scIentifically with feelings. One can attempt to describe their
physiological signs. Where this is not possible-and I am
afraid that the oceanic feeling too will defy this kind of
characterization-nothing remains but to fall back on the
ideational content which is most readily associated with the
feeling. If I have understood my friend rightly, he means the
same thing by it as the consolation offered by an original and
somewhat eccentric dramatist to his hero who is facing a
self-inflicted death. ‘We cannot fall out of this world.’3 That
2[Footnote added 1931:] Liluli [1919].-Since the publication of his two
books La vie de Ramakrishna (1929] and La vie de Vivekananda (1930),
I need no longer hide the fact that the friend spoken of in the text is
Romain RoHand. [Romain Rol1and had written to Freud about the ‘oceanic
feeling’ in a letterof December 5, 1927: very soon after the publication of
The F,uture of an Illusion.]
3Christian Dietrich Grabbe [1801-36], Hannibal: ‘Ja, aus der Welt werden
wir nicht faHen. Wir sind einmal darin: [‘Indeed, we shaH not fall out of
this world. We are in it once and for all:]
is to say, it is.a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being one
with the external world as a whole. I may remark that to me
this seems something rather in the nature of an intellectual
perception, which is not, it is true, without· an accompanying feeling-tone, but only such as would be present with any
other act of thought of equal range. From my own experience I could not convince myself of the primary nature of
such a feeling. But this gives me no right to deny that it does
in fact occur in other people. The only question is whether
it is being correctly interpreted and whether it ought to be .
regarded as the tons et origo of the whole need for religion.
I have nothing to suggest which could have a decisive
inHuence on the solution of this problem. The idea of men’s
receiving an intimation of their connection with the world
around them through an immediate feeling which is from
the outset directed to that purpose sounds so strange and fits
in so badly with the fabric of our psychology that one is
justified in attempting to discover a psycho-analytic-that
is, a genetic-explanation of such a feeling. The following
line of thought suggests itself. Normally, there is nothing of
which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of
our own ego.” This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off distinctly from everything
else. That such an appearance is deceptive, -and that on the
contrary the ego is continued inwards, without any sharp
delimitation, into an unconscious mental entity which we
designate as the id and for which it serves as a kind of
facade-this was a discovery first made by psycho-analytic
research, which should still have much more to tell us about
the relation of the ego to the id. But towards the outside,
4[Some remarks on Freud’s use of the terms ‘ego’ and ‘self’ will be found
in the Editor’s Introduction to The Ego and the fd (1923b), Standard Ed.,
Civilization and Its Discontents
( 13
at any rate, the ego seems to maintain clear and sharp lines
of demarcation. There is only one state-admittedly an
unusual state, but not one that can be stigmatized as pathological-in which it does not do this. At the height of being
in love the boundary between ego and object threatens to
melt away. Against all the evidence of his senses, a man who
is in love declares that T and ‘you’ are one, and is’prepared
to behave as if it were a fact. 5 What can be temporarily done
awaywith by a physiological [i.e.normal] function must also,
of course, be liable to be disturbed by pathological processes.
Pathology has made us acquainted with a great number of
states in which the boundary lines between the ego and the
external world become uncertain or in which they are actually drawn incorrectly. There are cases in which parts of a
person’s own body, even portions of his own mental life-his
perceptions, thoughts and feelings-, appear alien to him
and as not belonging to his ego; there are other cases in
which he ascribes to the external world things that clearly
originate in his own ego and that ought to be acknowledged
by it. Thus even the feeling of our own ego is subject to
disturbances and the boundaries of the ego are not constant.
Further reflection tells us that the adult’s ego-feeling cannot have been the same from the beginning. It must have
gone through a process of development, which cannot, of
course, be demonstrated but which admits of being constructed with a fair degree of probability.6 An infant at the
breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external
world as the source of the sensations Howing in upon him.
He gradually learns to do so, in response to various prompt-
S[Cf. a footnote to Section III of the Schreber case history (1911C), Standard Ed., l2., 69.]
6Cf. the many writings on the topic of ego-development and ego-feeling,
dating from Ferenczi’s paper on ‘Stages in the Development of the Sense
of Reality’ (1913) to Fedem’s contributions of 1926, 1927 and later.
ings.7 He must be very strongly impressed by the fact that
some sources of excitation, which he wi1llater recognize as
his own bodily organs, can provide him with sensations at
any moment, whereas other sources evade him from time to
time-among them what he desires most of all, his mother’s
breast-and only reappear as a result of his screaming for
help. In this way there is for the first time set over against
the ego an ‘object’, in the form of something which exists
‘outside’ and which is only forced to appear by a special
action.8 A further incentive to a disengagement of the ego
from the general mass of sensations-that is, to the recognition of an ‘outside’, an external world-is provided by the
frequent, manifold and unavoidable sensations of pain and
unpleasure the removal and avoidance of which is enjoined
by the pleasure principle, in the exercise of its unrestricted
domination. A tendency arises to separate from the ego
everything that· can become a source of such unpleasure, to
throw it outside and to create a pure pleasure-ego which is
confronted by a strange and threatening ‘outside’. The
boundaries of this primitive pleasure-ego cannot escape rectification through experi’ence. Some of the things that one
is unwilling to give up, because they give pleasure, are nevertheless not ego but object; and some sufferings that one
seeks to expel turn out to be inseparable from the ego in
virtue of their internal origin. One comes to learn a procedure by which, through a deliberate direction of one’s sensory activities and through suitable muscular action, one can
7[In this paragraph Freud was going over familiar ground. He had discussed
the matter not long before, in his paper on ‘Negation’ (1925h), Standard
Ed., 19,236-8. But he had dealt with it on several earlier occasions. See,
for instance, ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915C),ibid., 14, 119 and
134-6, and The Interpretation of Dreams (Hp:Ja), ibid., 5, 565-6. Its
essence, indeed, is already to be found in the ‘Project’ of 1895, Sections
1, 2, 11 and 16 of Part I (Freud, 1950<1).] 8[The 'specific action' of the 'Project'.] Civilization and Its Discontents ( 15 Functioning' differentiate between what is internal-what beiongs to the ego-and what is external-what emanates from the outer world. In this way one makes the first step towards the introduction of the reality principle which. is to dominate future development. 9 This differentiation, 6f course, serves the practical purpose of enabling one to defend oneself against sensations of unpleasure which one actually feels or with which one is threatened. In order to fend off certain unpleasurable excitations arising from within,··the ego can use no other methods than those which it uses against unpleasure coming from without, and this is the starting-point of important pathological disturbances. In this way, then, the ego detaches itself nom the external world. Or, to put it more correctly, originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off ari external world from itself. Our present ego-feeling is, -therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive-indeed; an all-embracing-feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it. If we may assume that there are many people in whose mental life this primary ego-feeling has persisted to a greater or less degree, it would exist in them side by side with the narrower and more sharply demarcated ego-feeling of maturity, like a kind of counterpart to it. In that case,.the ideational contents appropriate to it would be precisely those of limitlessness and of a bond with the universe-the same ideas with which my friend elucidated the 'oceanic' feeling. But have we a right to assume the survival of something that was originally there, alongside of what was later derived from it? Undoubtedly. There is nothing strange in such a phenomenon, whether in the mental field or elsewhere. In 9[Cf. 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Menta] (1911b), Standard Ed., 12, 222-3.] 16) SIGMUND " FREUD " the animal kingdom we hold to the view that the most highly developed species have proceeded from the lowest; and yet we find all the simple forms still in existence to-day. The race of the great saurians is extinct and has made way for the mammals; but a true representative of it, the crocodile, still lives among us. This analogy may be too remote, and it is also weakened by the circumstance that the lower species which survive are for the most part not the true ancestors of the present-day-more highly developed species. As a rule the intermediate links have died out and are known to us only through reconstruction. In the realm of the mind, on the other hand, what is primitive is so commonly preserved alongside of the transformed version which has arisen from it that it is unnecessary to give instances as evidence. When this happens it is usually in consequence of a divergence in development: one portion (in the quantitative sense) of an attitude or instinctual impulse has remained unaltered, while another portion has undergone further development. This brings us to the more general problem of preservation in the sphere of the mind. The subject has hardly been studied as yet; 10 but it is so attractive and important that we may be allowed to turn our attention to it for a little, even though our excuse is insufficient. Since we overcame the error"of supposing that the forgetting we are familiar with signified a destruction of the memory-trace-that is, its annihilation-we have been inclined to take the opposite view, that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish-that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances (when, for instance, regression goes lO[A footnote on the subject was added by Freud in 1907 to Section F of the last chapter of 17zepsychopathology of Everyday Life (190 1b), Standard Ed., 6, 274-5.] Civilization and Its Discontents ( 17 back far enough) it can once more be brought to light. Let us try to grasp what this assumption involves by taking an analogy from another field. We will choose as an example the history of the Eternal City. 11 Historians tell us that the oldest Rome was the Roma Quadrata, a fenced settlement on the Palatine. Then followed the phase of the Septimontium, a federation of the settlements on the different hills; after that came the city bounded by the Servian wall; and later still, after all the transformations during the periods of "the republic and the early Caesars, the city which the Emperor Aurelian surrounded with his walls.We will not follow the changes which the city went through any further, but we will ask ourselves how much a visitor, whom we will suppose to be equipped with the most complete historical and topographical knowledge, may still find left of these early stages in the Rome of to-day. Except for a few gaps, he will see the wall of Aurelian almost unchanged. In some places he will be able to find sections of the Servian wall where they have been excavated and brought to light. If "he knows enough-more than present-day archaeology doeshe may perhaps be able to trace out in the plan of the city the whole course of that wall and the outline of the Roma Quadrata. Of the buildings which once occupied this ancient area he will find nothing, or only scanty remains, for they exist no longer. The best information about Rome in the republican era would only enable him at the most to point out the sites where the temples and public buildings of that period stood. Their place is now taken by ruins, but not by ruins of themselves but of later restorations made after fires or destruction. It is hardly necessary to remark that all these remains of ancient Rome are found dovetailed llBased on 17zeCambridge Ancient History, 7 (1928): 'The Founding of Rome' by Hugh Last. 18) SIGMUND FREUD into the jumble of a great metropolis which has grown up in the last few centuries since the Renaissance. There is certainly not a little that is ancient still buried in the soil of the city or beneath its modern buildings. This is the manner in which the past is preserved in historical sites like Rome. Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past-an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one. This would mean that in Rome the palaces of the Caesars and the Septizonium of Septimius Severus would still be rising to their old height on the Palatine and that the castle of S. Angelo would still be carrying on its battlements the beautiful statues which graced it until the siege by the Goths, and so on. But more than this. In the place occupied by the Palazzo Caffarelli would once more stand-without the Palazzo having to·be removed-the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus; and this not only in its latest shape, <18. the Romans of the Empire saw it, but also in its earliest one, when it still showed Etruscan forms and was ornamented with terra-cotta antefixes. Where the Coliseum now stands we could at the same time admire Nero's vanished Golden House. On the Piazza of the Pantheon we should find not only the Pantheon of to-day, as it w~sbequeathed to us by Hadrian, but, on the same site, the original edifice erected by Agrippa; indeed, the same piece of ground would be supporting the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva and the ancient temple over which it was built. And the observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance or his position in order to call up the one view or the other. There is clearly no point in spinning our phantasy any further, for it leads to things that are unimaginable and even Civilization and Its Discontents ( 19 absurd. If we want to represent historical sequence in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposition in space: the same space cannot have two different contents. Our attempt seems to be an idle game. It has only one justification. It shows us how far we are from mastering the characteristics of mental life by representing them in pictorial terms. There isone further objection which has to be considered. The question may be raised why we chose precisely the past of a city to compare with the past of the mind. The assumption that everything past is preserved holds good even in mental life only on condition that the organ of the mind has remained intact and that its tissues have not been damaged by trauma or inflammation. But destructive influences which can be compared to causes of illness like these are never lacking in the history of a city, even if it has had a less chequered past than Rome, and even if, like London, it has hardly ever suffered from the visitations of an enemy. Demolitions and replacement of buildings occur in the course of the most peaceful development of a city. A city is thus a Priori unsuited for a comparison of this sort with a mental orgamsm. We bow to this objection; and, abandoning our attempt to draw a striking contrast, we will turn instead to what is after all a more closely related object of comparison-the body of an animal or a human being. But here, too, we find the same thing. The earlier phases of development are in no sense still preserved; they have been absorbed into the later phases for which they have supplied the material. The embryo cannot be discovered in the adult. The thymus gland of childhood is replaced after puberty by connective tissue, but is no longer present itself; in the marrow-bones of the grown man I can, it is true, trace the outline of the child's bone, but it itself has disappeared, having lengthened and thickened until it has attained its definitive form. The fact r 20) S I G M U N D F R E U D remains that only in the mind is such a preservation of all the earlier stages alongside of the final form possible, and that we are not in a position to represent this phenomenon in pictorial terms.. Perhaps we are going too far in this. Perhaps we ought to content ourselves with asserting ... Purchase answer to see full attachment

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